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The existence of Trojan horses, viruses, and other malicious software has 
motivated the computer security industry to invent mechanisms that protect against 
malicious software. One such mechanism is called the Trusted Path. The Trusted Path 
provides a way for the system to authenticate itself to the user. Once invoked, the 
Trusted Path provides an environment in which the user can perform trusted operations 
such as login, logout, and change password. 
This thesis provides a high level design for a Trusted Path and an in depth 
analysis of how a Trusted Path can be implemented in the Linux operating system. 
Research of process family creation and keyboard handling has led to the implementation 
of a Secure Attention Key that can be used to invoke a Trusted Path in Linux. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. COMPUTER SECURITY 
The need for computer security is growing at an astounding rate, parallel with the 
Internet. The speed and ease of transferring data from one site to another is increasing, 
yet Internet users are realizing that the World Wide Web was not designed to protect data 
being transferred across the network. Electrical engineers are designing new 
communication media with high bandwidth, low noise, and low attenuation (e.g., fiber 
optics). Network engineers are designing better methods of relaying data between 
network hubs, bridges, and routers. Software engineers are designing better network and 
application protocols for using the data. Consequently, massive amounts of data are 
being transferred with virtually no protection. It is easy to transfer program files from a 
random Internet site and run them on a local computer. There are some web pages that 
automatically transfer and execute files on an accessing computer without the user's 
knowledge. Even with an up to date virus checker, a user cannot be confident that there 
is not a virus or a Trojan horse in a recently downloaded file. The existence of viruses, 
Trojan horses, and other types of malicious software is the motivation for this thesis. 
Computer security is very important to the future of computing, and standards have been 
set to ensure the survival of computer security in the new millennium. 
A computer with an operating system that enforces a security policy must be 
designed using the standards described in the government evaluation criteria described in 
the following section. This thesis discusses some of the essential mechanisms that are 
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needed in the design of the operating system for a secure computer. Particular emphasis 
is placed on accountability mechanisms such as Identification and Authentication and 
Trusted Path. 
B. SECURE COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA 
An early notable effort in computer security standards came in 1983 with the 
release of the Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria 
(TCSEC), commonly referred to as the "Orange Book" [Ref. I]. The most recent version 
of the Orange Book was released in 1985 and it lists the following purpose: 
... * To provide a standard to manufacturers as to what security features to 
build into their new and planned, commercial products in order to provide 
widely available systems that satisfy trust requirements (with particular 
emphasis on preventing the disclosure of data) for sensitive applications. 
* To provide DoD Components with a metric with which to evaluate the 
degree of trust that can be placed in computer systems for the secure 
processing of classified and other sensitive information. * To provide a 
basis for specifying security requirements in acquisition specifications. 
[Ref. I, p.2] 
The method used for evaluating a computer system against TCSEC was, and for 
some ongoing evaluations still is, the Trusted Product Evaluation Program (TPEP) 
[Ref.2]. TPEP evaluates systems and then rates them with one of seven TCSEC 
evaluation classes. The TCSEC classes are labeled from D 1 to A 1, with D 1 being the 
lowest (least secure) class. Each TCSEC class contains specific requirements for security 
policy, accountability, assurance, and documentation [Ref.l, p.5]. TPEP was sponsored 
by the National Computer Security Center (NCSC) but is now being replaced with the 
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Trust Technology Assessment Program (TTAP) [Ref.3]. TTAP is a program sponsored 
by the National Security Agency (NSA) that provides a means for commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) products to be evaluated. TTAP oversees the establishment and regulation 
ofTTAP Evaluation Facilities (TEF) [Ref.4]. Laboratories that want to become TEFs go 
through an application and evaluation process in order to be certified by the TT AP 
[Ref.3]. In addition to being a new program, TTAP also uses new evaluation criteria 
called the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CCITSE or 
CC) [Ref.5]. 
The CC differs from TCSEC in that it does not group all of the security 
requirements (policy, accountability, and assurance) into one class. The CC permits 
separate evaluation of Protection Profiles (PP) [Ref.6] (a conceptual design including 
policy and accountability) or Security Targets (ST) [Ref.?] (an implemented system 
design including policy and accountability). After the evaluation, the PP or ST is 
assigned an Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) [Ref.8] that is used as a marker for the 
level of assurance that should be placed in the PP or ST. It is easy to be misled and 
compare EALs (assurance only) directly to TCSEC classes that contain policy, 
accountability, and assurance. It is the PP or ST that contains the security policy and 
accountability requirements previously included in the TCSEC classes. Therefore, even 
though a PP may have a high EAL, it may compare to class D 1 in TCSEC. It is important 
to be sure the PP fits the security policy that is needed by the system. One of the current 
efforts of the TT AP is the evaluation of PPs that contain the requirements from popular 
TCSEC classes. The difficulty when making these new PPs is that the CC contains a lot 
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more detail in its evaluation criteria and some of the TCSEC requirements are somewhat 
vague in comparison. 
C. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION 
Computers that provide access to users commonly have a mechanism that 
provides assurance to the system that the user is not an impostor (i.e., usemame and 
password entry). This mechanism is called "Identification and Authentication". The 
TCSEC section on Identification and Authentication states: 
The TCB [Trusted Computing Base] shall require users to identify 
themselves to it before beginning to perform any other actions that the 
TCB is expected to mediate. Furthermore, the TCB shall use a protected 
mechanism (e.g., passwords) to authenticate the user's identity. The TCB 
shall protect authentication data so that it cannot be accessed by any 
unauthorized user. [Ref. I, p.12] 
Computer systems to be evaluated by the TCSEC are required to provide Identification 
and Authentication at classes of C 1 and higher. Class C 1 is defined as providing low 
protection discretionary access control. The CC section on Identification and 
Authentication states: 
Families in this class [Class FIA: Identification and Authentication] 
address the requirements for functions to establish and verify a claimed 
user identity. Identification and Authentication is required to ensure that 
users are associated with the proper security attributes (e.g. identity, 
groups, roles, security or integrity levels). The unambiguous identification 
of authorized users and the correct association of security attributes with 
users and subjects is critical to the enforcement of the intended security 
policies. [Ref.5, Part 2, p.79] 
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The entry of a usemame and password to gain access to a computer is a familiar 
form of Identification and Authentication. The problem with many Identification and 
Authentication implementations is that they do not provide a mechanism for the system to 
authenticate itself to the user. It is very easy for an attacker to write a program that can 
look and feel exactly like the login process for a given computer. If it is easy to look and 
feel like a login program, then it is just as easy to steal a password, store it somewhere for 
later retrieval, print an error message to the console, and then start the "real" login 
program. The user would think the error message was caused by a typo and never suspect 
that the password was stolen. Figure 1 is an example of a login terminal for the Linux 
operating system. 
Red Hat Linux release 6.0 (Hedwig) 




Figure 1. Example Login Terminal 
The scenario described above is called "login spoofing" which is accomplished 
using "masquerading software". Masquerading software can be used when an attacker 
wants to obtain information by posing as a familiar process. The existence of 
masquerading software is one of the motivations for the design of the Trusted Path. 
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D. THE TRUSTED PATH 
So that the user has a high level of assurance that the system being accessed is the 
"real" system rather than masquerading software, the system must have a Trusted Path. 
The Trusted Path is a mechanism that provides a way for the system to authenticate itself 
to the user. The TCSEC requires the Trusted Path at Class B2 and higher [Ref. I, p.29]. 
The TCSEC definition of the Trusted Path is, "A mechanism by which a person at a 
terminal can communicate directly with the Trusted Computing Base. This mechanism 
can only be activated by the person or the Trusted Computing Base and cannot be 
imitated by untrusted software" [Ref. I, p.l17]. The CC section on the Trusted Path 
states: 
A trusted path provides a means for users to perform functions through an 
assured direct interaction with the TSF [Target of Evaluation Security 
Functions]. Trusted path is usually desired for user actions such as initial 
identification and/or authentication, but may also be desired at other times 
during a user's session. Trusted path exchanges may be initiated by a user 
or the TSF. User responses via the trusted path are guaranteed to be 
protected from modification by or disclosure to untrusted applications. 
[Ref.5, Part2, p.l67]. 
The mechanism that is normally used to invoke a Trusted Path is called the Secure 
Attention Key (SAK) [Ref.9, p.67]. Traditionally, the Secure Attention Key has been 
implemented using a sequence of keystrokes from a keyboard connected to a system 
terminal. The TCSEC and CC do not reference the term "Secure Attention Key"; they 
only suggest that there must be a way for the user to initiate a Trusted Path. Turning the 
computer OFF and then ON again could be considered crude form of SAK. When the 
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Trusted Path is invoked (i.e., using the SAK), all other user processes using the terminal 
are suspended or killed (depending on the implementation or state of the system) while 
the Trusted Path remains active. Some Trusted Paths give the user options such as 
logout, shutdown, restart, and end task (kill process). The options that are provided to the 
user may support some other reasons for having a Trusted Path such as the ability to 
escape from an unwanted state (i.e., endless loop, deadlock), change a password, change 
session level, and modify access privileges. The following sections describe a few 
evaluated systems that have implemented a Trusted Path. 
1. Microsoft Windows NT 
Microsoft Windows NT Workstation and Windows NT Server Version 4.0 with 
Service Pack 6a and C2 Update has been rated Class C2 by the National Security Agency 
(NSA) in accordance with the TCSEC [Ref.lO]. The rating was announced in November 
1999 and was conducted by the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), 
Center for Information Security Technology, Evaluation Laboratory. The version of 
Windows NT mentioned above is the most recently evaluated version and has evolved 
from the previous version 3.5 that was rated Class C2 with Service Pack 3 [Ref.ll]. The 
evaluation summary for version 3.5 included the following remarks regarding Trusted 
Path: 
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... the Windows NT platform was examined against the B2 Trusted Path 
and B2 Trusted Facility Management functional requirements of the 
TCSEC. A system that satisfies the B2 Trusted Path functional 
requirement supports a trusted communication path between itself and the 
user for identification and authentication. A system that satisfies the B2 
Trusted Facility Management functional requirements supports the ability 
to separate operator and administrator functions. Although the Windows 
NT platform satisfies these functional requirements at the B2 level, it was 
not evaluated against any assurance requirements above its rated C2 level. 
[Ref.ll] 
Windows NT uses a window to notify the user that the SAK must be pressed in order to 
start a user session. The window displays: "Press Ctrl+Alt+Delete to log on". The SAK 
for Windows NT is the simultaneous key sequence "Control", "Alt", and "Delete". When 
the SAK is pressed the user is presented a Logon Information (Trusted Path) window that 





• Shut Down 
After the user has successfully logged onto the system, the Trusted Path offers different 
options to the user. When the SAK is pressed, the Windows NT Security (Trusted Path) 
window is presented with current logon information and the following options: 
• Lock Workstation 
• Logoff 
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• Shut Down 
• Change Password 
• Task Manager 
• Cancel 
By pressing the SAK, the user is given assurance that they are actually communicating 
with the system and not to masquerading software. Important tasks such as password 
entry and password changing are only available to regular users after invoking the Trusted 
Path. 
2. Trusted Solaris 
Trusted Solaris 7 is the most recent version of the system offered by Sun 
Microsystems, Inc. and is entering into evaluation under the Common Criteria with the 
goal of receiving an EAlA evaluation class for Trusted Solaris 8 shortly after the product 
is released. Trusted Solaris 7 will not receive an evaluation class [Ref.12]. The Trusted 
Solaris 7 is derived from previous versions of Trusted Solaris that have been evaluated by 
the National Computer Security Center (NCSC), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 
and the United Kingdom Information Technology Security (UK ITSEC) scheme. The 
Trusted Solaris system was originally designed to be evaluated as a compartmented mode 
workstation (CMW) system. A system evaluated as meeting DIA criteria for a CMW 
system also has a Class Bl rating according to the NCSC criteria (TCSEC) [Ref.13, p.4]. 
As is with Windows NT, even though Trusted Solaris has not been evaluated as a Class 
B2 system, it has implemented a Trusted Path. 
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The Trusted Solaris Trusted Path is different in that it does not use the keyboard 
for its SAK. All of the Trusted Path options are accessed via a windows-based Graphical 
User Interface (GUI) and a mouse (the mouse is used as the SAK). The Trusted Path is 
activated in one of two ways: from the label stripe of a window or from the screenstripe 
[Ref.14, p.lO]. The screenstripe (always visible) is located at the bottom of the screen 
and displays information based on what is happening with the mouse pointer, the 
keyboard, and the windows on the screen. This section focuses only on the Trusted Path 
for the Trusted Solaris. The "Security Features User's Guide to Trusted Solaris" provides 
complete explanations of security features available via the Trusted Path [Ref.13]. When 
the MENU button on the mouse is pressed while hovering over the label stripe of a 
window, the following Trusted Path options are presented: 
• Show Full Window Label - shows the information and sensitivity labels of the 
window [Ref.14, p.60]. 
• Set Input Information Label - used to set the input information label from the 
keyboard [Ref.14, p.61]. 
When the MENU button on the mouse is pressed while hovering over the screenstripe, 
the Trusted Path Menu appears. 
The Trusted Path Menu is divided into two main sections: Utilities and Set 
Labels. The initial Trusted Path Menu window that is displayed contains the Utilities and 
Set Labels directories along with options for Change Password and Set Screen Access. 
Table 1 lists and describes the Trusted Path Menu options for the Utilities and Set Labels 









File and Directories 
Workspace Menu SL 
Cut and Paste Defaults 
Description 
Redraw the screen 
Open/close, full/restore size, quit 
Save current window configuration 




Set file labels 
Set workspace menu label 
-------1 
Display selection labeler _____ _, 
Table 1. Trusted Solaris Trusted Path Menu Options 
A major difference between the Trusted Solaris and the other two systems 
described in this chapter is the login process. The user is not given an option to enter the 
Trusted Path before entering login information. The Trusted Solaris Security Features 
User's Guide states: 
When the login tool or lockscreen application is running, the screenstripe 
is not visible; instead, the entire background, including the area of the 
screenstripe, displays a trusted pattern. [Ref.14, p.lO] 
The guide does not describe what the trusted pattern is supposed to look like. However, 
since only the Trusted part of the system has the authority to cover up the screenstripe 
(which the login tool does), the user can feel confident that the system is in a Trusted 
state. 
3. XTS-300 
The XTS-300 is a combination of STOP, a multilevel secure operating system, 
and an Intel x86 hardware base (supplied by Wang Government Services, Inc.). XTS-300 
STOP 4.4.2 has been rated Class B3 by the NSA in accordance with the TCSEC [Ref.15]. 
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The XTS-300 STOP 4.4.2 is the most recently evaluated version of the product (March 
1998) and has evolved from the XTS-200 STOP 3.l.E that was rated Class B3 in May 
1992 [Ref.16]. The XTS-200 evolved from the SCOMP Version STOP 2.1 that was 
rated Class A1 in December 1984 [Ref.16]. Since the XTS-300 has been evaluated at 
Class B3 and the Trusted Path is required at Classes greater than or equal to B2, it follows 
that there is a Trusted Path on the XTS-300. 
Unlike Windows NT, the XTS-300 does not provide notification to the user that 
the SAK must be pressed in order to start a session. After the system is booted, there is 
no way for the user to communicate with the system until the SAK has been pressed. The 
SAK for the XTS-300 console is the simultaneous key sequence "Alt" and "SysRq" 
[Ref.17, p.9]. When the SAKis pressed, the user is connected with the Secure Server. 
The Secure Server is that portion of Trusted Software that processes terminal commands 
[Ref.17, p.9]. When first logging into the system, the Secure Sever prompts the user to ' 
enter a username and password [Ref.17, p.ll]. After the user has successfully logged 
onto the system, the Secure Server (Trusted Path) offers different options to the user. 
When the SAK is pressed, the user is connected with the Secure Server in the trusted 
environment and prompted to enter a command [Ref.17, p.14]. The commands available 
to the user are called TCB (Trusted Computing Base) User Commands and they are split 
into 4 categories: Process Management, Session Management, File Management, and 
System Status. Table 2 lists and describes the TCB User Commands for each category 
[Ref.17, p.l5-38]. 
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Process Management Description 
Disconnect Disassociate a process family from a user sesion 
(active processes will continue to run after logout) 
Ikill Immediately kill all processes in specified family 
(guarantees termination of the process family) 
Kill Kill all processes in specified family (does not 
guarantee termination of the process family) 
Logout Log off system 
Reattach Reconnect to a process family (return to an existing 
UNIX session) 
Run Begin execution of a process family (leave trusted 
environment and start a UNIX shell) 
Session Management Description (used for setting up UNIX shell) 
Ccp Change command processor pathname 
Cdl Change default level 
Chd Change home directory pathname 
Cup Change user password 
Sg Set group identifier for the current session 
Sl Set access level for the currenet session 
File Management Description 
Fsm Provides various functions for displaying, 
modifying, or deleting file system objects 
System Status Description 
Session Display information about the current session 
System Display system status information 
Table 2. XTS-300 TCB User Commands Available Through The Trusted Path 
Table 2 reflects only the commands available to the user. There are 3 distinct 
roles in the XTS-300 environment: 






It is important to note that there are several other TCB commands that are available to 
people with higher privelege levels (system administrators and operators). Trusted 
activities such as configuring, bypassing, activating, or deactivating security features are 
available to administrators and operators only[Ref.18, p.l]. 
The XTS-300 supports an X-Windows (GUI) environment for use outside of the 
TCB. When the SAKis pressed during an X-Windows session, the X-Windows process 
family is detached and the Secure Server prompt appears. The Trusted Environment for 
the XTS-300, though not as GUI oriented as Windows NT, pro~ides a much larger 
variety of options to the user. 
Also, the XTS-300 contains functionality similar to the Linux operating system 
(command shell support, X-windows, and a UNIX compatible non-trusted environment) 
which makes it a good reference for the design of a Trusted Path for Linux. 
E. POLICY ENHANCED LINUX 
Clark describes a low cost approach to implementing a Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC) security policy using the Linux operating system [Ref.19]. In his conclusions, 
Clark suggests the implementation of a Trusted Path for use with the version of Policy 
Enhanced Linux resulting from his work. The remainder of this thesis is dedicated to 
providing the design and implementation of a Trusted Path for Policy Enhanced Linux 
[Ref.19] 
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II. TRUSTED PATH HIGH LEVEL DESIGN 
This chapter provides a high level description of the trusted path user interface. 
Chapter III describes lower level Linux modifications to implement the design. 
A. USERINTERFACE 
There are a number of different states from which the user can apply the Secure 
Attention Key to invoke the Trusted Path. Consequently, invocation of the Trusted Path 
can lead to more than one state within the Trusted Path itself. More specifically, the SAK 
does not always bring the user to the same interface, rather it is dependent upon the state 
the system is in at the time the SAK is pressed. It is important to account for each 
possible system state and thel) which interface should be used. Figure 2 displays the 
Finite State Machine for the User Interface. 
15 
Figure 2. User Interface Finite State Machine 
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1. Start 
This state covers the entire boot and initialization process of the system. If the 
SAK is pressed while the system is in the Start state, nothing will happen and the system 
will continue initializing. 
2. Ready 
Once the operating system finishes its initialization and all of the appropriate 
processes are running, the system enters the Ready state in which the user is given a 
prompt. At this point the user must use the Trusted Path in order to gain access to the 
system. This state will display a message to the user that asks for the SAK to be pressed 
in order to start. Only the SAK will allow the system to start the Trusted Path and start 
the login process. 
3. Login Prompt 
This state is reached from the Ready state or from the Password Prompt state after 
the SAK has been pressed. There will be a display to the user that shows the trusted path 
is active. Also, the login prompt will be displayed requesting a usemame. At this point if 
the SAK is pressed, the Trusted Path will restart and the previously mentioned displays 
will be redisplayed. When a usemame (valid or invalid) is entered, the Trusted Path 
moves to the Password Prompt state. 
4. Password Prompt 
This state is reached from the Login Prompt after a usemame has been entered. 
There will be a display to the user that shows the trusted path is active. Also, the 
password prompt will be displayed requesting a password. At this point if the SAK is 
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pressed, the Trusted Path will move to the Login Prompt state. If a valid password is 
entered, the Trusted Path will move to the Trusted Path Menu. If a password has not 
been entered in a reasonable amount of time (the timeout interval), the user is returned to 
the Login Prompt. If an invalid password is entered, the user is returned to the Ready 
state and is prompted to press the SAK again. 
5. Trusted Path Menu 
This state is reached from many states and is the workhorse of the Trusted Path. 
There will be a display to the user that shows the trusted path is active and the current 
session level being used. Also, there will be a prompt for the user to select from the 
following menu options: 
0-Help 
1- Logout 
2 - Session Level 
3 - Change Password 
4-Run 
5 - List Sessions 
6 - Kill Session 
Other options such as reboot and halt could be added as administrator option 
functions presented to those who are configured as administrators. At this point if the 
SAK is pressed, the Trusted Path Menu will be redisplayed. Selection of a particular 
option will move the Trusted Path to the associated state. 
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6. Help 
This state is reached from the Trusted Path Menu (Option 0). There will be a 
display to the user that shows the trusted path is active. The user will be provided with 
text explaining how the Trusted Path Menu should be used. At this point if the SAK or 
any other key is pressed, the user is returned to the Trusted Path Menu. 
7. Session Level Prompt 
This state is reached from the Trusted Path Menu (Option 2). There will be a 
display to the user that shows the trusted path is active. There will be a user prompt and 
an example of how to specify a session level (i.e., how to type in the level and any 
categories). At this point if the SAKis pressed, the user is returned to the Trusted Path 
Menu without changing the session level. When an invalid session level is entered or the 
level is outside the user's clearance, the current session level is not changed, a message is 
displayed telling the user what was done incorrectly, and the user is returned, to the 
Session Level Menu. When a valid session level is entered, the current session level is 
set to the entered session level and the user is returned to the Trusted Path Menu. 
8. Change Password 
This state is reached from the Trusted Path Menu (Option 3). There will be a 
display to, the user that shows the trusted path is active. The user will be prompted to 
enter the old password. At this point if the SAK is pressed or an invalid password is 
entered, the user is returned to the Trusted Path Menu without changing the password. 
After the old password is entered and verified to be true, the Trusted Path moves to the 
New Password state. 
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9. New Password 
This state is reached by typing a valid password at the Change Password state. 
There will be a display to the user that shows the trusted path is active. The user will be 
prompted to enter a new password. At this point if the SAK is pressed, the user is 
returned to the Trusted Path Menu without changing the password. After the new 
password is entered, the Trusted Path moves to the Confirm and Change state. 
10. Confirm and Change 
This state is reached by typing a new password at the New Password state. There 
will be a display to the user that shows the trusted path is active. The user will be 
prompted to re-enter the new password. At this point if the SAK is pressed, the user is 
returned to the Trusted Path Menu without changing the password. If the password 
entered is valid, the password is changed and the user is returned to the Trusted Path 
Menu. If the password entered is invalid, the user is returned to the New Password State. 
11. Run 
This state is reached from the Trusted Path Menu (Option 4). A user shell will be 
created at the current session level and the user will no longer be informed that the trusted 
path is active. The SAKis the only way to get back to the Trusted Path Menu from this 
state. 
12. List Sessions 
This state is reached from the Trusted Path Menu (Option 5). There will be a 
display to the user that shows the trusted path is active. The user will be provided with a 
list of sessions that are currently available. The list of sessions will display the name of 
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the sessions and the associated levels. At this point if the SAK or any other key is 
pressed, the user will be returned to the Trusted Path Menu. 
13. Kill Session Menu 
This state is reached from the Trusted Path Menu (Option 6). There will be a 
display to the user that shows the trusted path is active. There will be a prompt for the 
user to select from the following menu options: 
0- go back 
1 - kill session level 1 
2 - kill session level 2 
... and so on depending on the number of open session levels 
At this point if the SAK is pressed, the user will be taken back to the Trusted Path Menu 
and no sessions will be killed. Selection of a particular option will kill the associated 
session. 
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III. TRUSTED PATH HIGH LEVEL DESIGN FOR LINUX 
This chapter describes the current design (login, SAK, process management) used 
by Red Hat Linux 6.0 and the modifications needed to implement the high level design 
from the previous chapter. 
A. USER INTERFACE 
1. Red Hat Linux 6.0 Getty/Login 
Linux currently uses the user applications 'mingetty' and 'login' to start a 
command shell. The 'mingetty' application is spawned by the first process in the Linux 
Process Table, called 'init' [Ref.20, p.389]. The 'init' process is assigned process 
identification number (PID) 1. All processes that are created and placed on the Linux 
Process Table are children of 'init'. The 'mingetty' application is started after 'init' starts 
several other processes that are required for the operating system to function properly. 
This section only discusses the processes necessary for a user to login to the system. 
'Init' and other (parent) processes are able to create new (child) processes by 
using the 'fork' system call [Ref.20, p.306]. The 'fork' system call generates a child 
process as a copy of the parent process. When the copy is made, a new PID is assigned to 
the child process and only the page tables and process structure are duplicated. Once a 
child process has been created, the 'execve' system call can be used to execute a new 
program using the task structure of the child [Ref.20, p.345]. More specifically, 'execve' 
overlays the calling (child) process by overwriting the calling process' code segment with 
the loaded program. The program inherits the PID of the calling process and any pending 
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signals are deleted. Basically, the calling process is replaced by the loaded program to 
create a new process that recycles the PID and task structure of the calling process. The 
system calls 'fork' and 'execve' are used to add to the Linux Process Table and as such 
are instrumental in the following description of the user login process. Figure 3 displays 
the User Login Finite State Machine and the associated Process Flow Diagram. The 
dotted lines represent the areas where the Process Flow Diagram and User Login FSM are 
directly related (correlation). 
User L ogbt FS M Process Flow Diagram 
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Figure 3. User Login Finite State Machine For Standard Linux 
The 'init' process forks and adds the 'rningetty' application to the process table. The 
'mingetty' application displays a login prompt to the user and waits for a usemame to be 
entered. 
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It is important to note that most Linux releases are defaulted to initialize more 
than one user terminal (tty) after startup. The 'init' process looks at a file called 'inittab' 
(normally located in the '/etc' directory) for a list of programs to run at startup [Ref.21]. 
Essentially, the 'inittab' file is the map that 'init' uses to set up the system and start at a 
specified run level. The 'inittab' file for Red Hat Linux 6.0 is configured to initialize 6 
ttys. Each tty is set up by using the 'rningetty' application. The following example is for 
a system that is using only one tty. Figure 4 displays three important views to aid 
understanding how the user login process is started. First, an example of the process 
table is provided (the actual process table is much larger and includes all of the processes 
created by 'init' at startup, including the other 5 ttys ). Second, an example of the tty 
display shows what the user can see at the terminal. Third, a snapshot of the finite state 
machine shows the location of the process execution flow at this point. 
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Process Table After System Startup!Boot: TTY Display: 
UID PID PPID Cl\ID 
root 1 0 init 
root 435 1 /sbin/mingetty 
Snapshot From Figure 3: 
User Login FSM 
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Figure 4. Process Table After System Startup/Boot 
After a usemame is entered at the login prompt, 'rningetty' executes the 'login' 
application. The 'login' application displays a password prompt to the user and waits for 
a password to be entered. Figure 5 shows the process table, tty display, and process 
execution flow for this state. Note the PID is the same as it was for 'rningetty'. The 
'login' application is not assigned a new PID because 'rningetty' used the 'execve' 
("/binllogin") system call which allows another executable ('login') to take over the 
current position in the process table. 
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Process Table: 
lJID PID PPID 




Red Hat Linux release 6. 0 (Hedwig) 
Kernel 2.2.5-15 on a i386 
root 435 1 lb infl o gin - Login: root 
Password: 




; PID 435 1 
, ............. -- ............ , 
Figure 5. Process Table After Username Is Entered 
If an invalid username/password pair is received, then 'login' exits and 'mingetty' 
is respawned by 'init'. When the 'login' application receives a valid username/password 
pair, then the shell application ('bash') is started as a separate process. Once the shell is 
started, then the user is considered logged into the system and is able to type commands 
at the terminal. Figure 6 shows the process table, tty display, and process execution flow 
for this state. Note that 'login' uses the 'fork' system call and creates a new PID before 
starting 'bash' with the 'execve' system call. 
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Process Table: 
UID PID PPID 
root 1 0 
root 435 1 





Snapshot From Figure 3: 
TTY Display: 
Red Hat Linux release 6. 0 (Hedwig) 
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Figure 6. Process Table After Password Entered 
The previous description of the Linux login process is a precursor to the next section that 
suggests modifications needed to implement a Trusted Path in Linux. 
2. Modifications Needed 
This section describes the modifications and additions required to implement the 

























Figure 7. Trusted Path Process Flow Diagram 
a. Dumb Min getty Process (dumb getty) 
The dumb 'mingetty' or 'dumbgetty' process is a replacement for the 
current 'mingetty' process. The original 'mingetty' is being replaced because it is a user 
application and the Trusted Path must reside in the kernel. Therefore, 'mingetty' is no 
longer needed for login but something is needed to provide information to the user at 
system start up. The 'dumbgetty' program will provide a display that asks the user to 
press the SAK in order to invoke the Trusted Path User Interface. The login prompt can 
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be spoofed, so it is important to train users to always use the SAK to start a session. The 
'dumbgetty' program will also serve (indirectly) as a parent process to newly created 
sessions. A parent process is required for all newly created processes. When a new 
session process family is created, the Session_Driver (described later) will use the PID for 
'dumbgetty' in order to masquerade as the parent process and create new children. 
b. Login_Driver 
The source code for the Login_Driver will be called 'login.c' and will 
reside in the '/linux/drivers/char/' directory. The code will be a combination of the 
original 'mingetty' and 'login' applications. The login module will represent and contain 
all of the functionality of the Login Prompt and Password Prompt states described in 
Chapter II. The original user applications such as 'mingetty' and 'login' can be easily 
modified and recompiled by a user, thus violating wha~ little security is offered by Linux. 
In order to prevent a login spoof attack, this driver and the following suggested modules 
and drivers must reside in the kernel. 
c. State_Module 
The source code for the State_Module will be called 'state.c' and will 
reside in the 'llinux/drivers/char/' directory. The code will contain the memory-resident 
variable that maintains the current state of the Trusted Path. All changes in state will be 
caused by one of the Trusted Path modules (Login or Trusted Path Menu). Therefore, it 
is necessary to implement the State_Module in the kernel because it must be accessible to 
all of the Trusted Path modules. 
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To perform the correct action, the SAK_Driver must know the state of the 
Trusted Path. The memory-resident variable contained in the State_Module will be called 
'TPState'. TPState will hold a number value based on the following possible states 
(described in detail in Chapter II): 
- Start 
2 - Ready 
3 - Login Prompt 
4 - Password Prompt 
5 - Trusted Path Menu 
6 - Help 
7 - Session Level Prompt 
8 - Change Password 
9 - New Password 
10 - Confirm and Change 
11 - Run 
12 - List Sessions 
13 - Kill Session Menu 
TPState will be referenced by the SAK_Driver in order to learn the current Trusted Path 




A database containing the active sessions and associated PIDs is necessary 
for keeping track of session information. The database will be used by the 
Session_Driver (described later) to perform various session operations such as kill 
session, set session, and update current session. The database is a list of memory-resident 
structures containing session information for all of the available sessions. The structure is 
called "TPSession" and contains the following elements: 
• active: is true when session is the active/current session 
• PID: holds the PID of the first process in the session family 
• label: holds the session level information, needed by Policy Enhanced 
Linux [Ref.l9] 
The Session_Database will be encapsulated by the Session_Driver described next. 
e. Session_Driver 
The source code for the Session_Driver will be called 'session.c' and will 
reside in the '/linux/drivers/char/' directory. The Session_Driver is an interface resident 
in the kernel to handle the creation, reactivation, suspension, and termination of user 
sessions. 
The Session_Driver encapsulates and manages the Session_Database and 
is the only interface that will reference the Session_Database. The declaration for the 
'TPSession' structures (Session_Database) is located in the Session_Driver. 
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(1) Creation. The Session_Driver looks in the 
Session_Database to see if there is a session listed that matches the currentSession 
variable provided by the Trusted_Path_Menu_Driver. If there is a matching session, then 
it must be reactivated (see next section on 'Reactivation'). If there is not a matching 
session, then a new session must be created. The new session is created based on the 
value of the currentSession variable. The Session_Driver creates a new session by 
masquerading as 'dumbgetty', calling 'fork', and within the cloned child process calling 
'execve' to start 'bash' for the requested session level. After the session is created a new 
TPSession structure is added to the Session_Database and the 'active' flag is set. Also, if 
the 'active' flag was set for any other session, it is toggled to false. There can be only one 
active session. 
(2) Reactivation. If the currentSession variable 
matches a session listed in the Session_Database, then it must be reactivated. The 
Session_Driver must alter some portion of the session process family structure to allow 
scheduling to resume. After the session is reactivated, the 'active' flag is set for the 
session in the Session_Database. Also, if the 'active' flag was set for any other session, it 
is toggled to false at this time. 
(3) Suspension. When the SAK is pressed and the 
previous state listed in the State_Module is equal to Run (TPState = 1 0), then the 
Session_Driver must suspend the active session process family from being scheduled. 
(4) Termination. When the Kill Session Menu is used 
to kill a session, control is passed from the Trusted_Path_Menu_Driver to the 
Session_Driver and the process family for the selected session is deleted from the process 
table and the Session_Database. 
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f Trusted_Path_Menu_Driver 
The source code for the Trusted_Path_Menu_Driver will be called 
'trustedmenu.c' and will reside in the '/linux/drivers/char/' directory. The code will 
represent and contain all of the functionality of the Trusted Path Menu and associated 
states (Help, Session Level Prompt, Change Password, List Sessions, Kill Session Menu) 
described in Chapter IT. In addition, the Trusted_Path_Menu_Driver will have a memory-
resident variable called 'currentSession' that keeps track of the current 'active' session. 
g. SAK Driver 
The SAK driver is described in the next section which provides a detailed 
description of how and where it be implemented. 
B. SECURE ATTENTION KEY (SAK) 
1. Red Hat Linux 6.0 SAK 
There exists a function called 'do_SAK' in the tty driver that, when called, 
abruptly kills all the tasks asssociated with the tty and forces mingetty to be respawned. 
The 'do_SAK' function is found in the 'linux/drivers/char/tty_io.c' source file [Ref.22]. 
The code comments listed prior to the 'do_SAK' function state: 
This implements the "Secure Attention Key" --- the idea is to prevent 
trojan horses by killing all processes associated with this tty when the user 
hits the "Secure Attention Key". Required for super-paranoid applications 
--- see the Orange Book for more details. [Ref.22] 
The 'do_SAK' function serves its purpose for those who know how and when to use it. 
However, it is not widely known by Linux users and is not a good example of how a 
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Trusted Path should function. The function 'do_SAK' does not recognize the pressing of 
the "Secure Attention Key". The function 'do_SAK' does implement what the SAK does 
after it has been pressed. There are at least two different ways of using the keyboard to 
invoke the 'do_SAK' function and implement the SAK. These implementations are 
described in the following subsections. 
a. Magic System Request Key 
The 'Magic System Request Key' (MSRK) was implemented as a tool for 
Linux kernel programmers. The code for the MSRK is found in the 
'linux/drivers/char/sysrq.c' source file [Ref.23]. The Red Hat Linux 6.0 default 
configuration for the Linux kernel has this option turned on. The MSRK can be turned 
on a..TJ.d off by reconfiguring and recompiling the kernel. The reconfiguration option is 
located in the 'Kernel Hacking' section of the Linux configuration menu [Ref.24]. The 
key sequence for the MSRK is 'Alt-SysRq' and one of the following keys: 
'R' reset keyboard to XLATE mode 
'K' call 'do_SAK' using the current tty 
'B' restart the machine immediately 
'0' power off the machine 
'S' emergency sync 
'U' emergency remount 
'P' show registers (pt_regs) 
'T' show task (process) information 
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'M' show memory information 
'0' . .'9' set console logging level 
'E' terminate all user processes 
'I' kill all user processes 
'L' kill all processes including init 
'Any other key' - prints the following help string: 
Sync Unmount showPc showTasks showMem loglevel0-8 tErm klll 
kill alL 
The call to the 'do_SAK' function has been accomplished in the code for the 'K' option 
of the MSRK. The MSRK interface is called when the Alt-SysRq is pressed and then it 
waits for another keypress to perform the specific task. The Alt-SysRq sequence is 
recognized in the keyboard driver which is found in the 'linux/drivers/char/keyboard.c' 
source file [Ref.25]. 
The keyboard driver includes code that is only implemented if the MSRK 
has been turned on during kernel configuration. If the MSRK is enabled, the keyboard 
driver recognizes the Alt-SysRq key sequence (keycode = 84) and passes control to the 
MSRK before handing the keycode/scancode(s) to the current keyboard mode controller 
for processing [Ref.25]. The keyboard driver does the following: 
1 - Receives scancodes created by key presses from the keyboard 
2 - Converts the hexidecimal scancode(s) to a single decimal keycode 




4 The keyboard mode controller passes the appropriate code(s) 
(ASCII, Unicode, keycode, raw scancodes) to the terminal driver 
[Ref.26]. 
The MSRK code in the keyboard driver bypasses steps 3 and 4 described above, 
effectively cutting off any chance for remapping the keycode to something else. 
Therefore, it is a good implementation of a SAK that communicates directly with the 
kernel. This will be the basis for the implementation of the SAK for Policy Enhanced 
Linux. Figure 8 shows how data flows through the keyboard driver with and without the 
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'Loadkeys' is a user application that was implemented for the main 
purpose of loading the kernel keymap when the keyboard is in translate (XLATE) mode 
[Ref.26]. The translate mode controller uses keymaps to assign keycodes to key symbols. 
Key symbols are evaluated and processed by the key handler in the keyboard driver. 
Then, the key handler passes the appropriate code(s) to the terminal (step 4 from the 
previous section) [Ref.26]. 'Loadkeys' provides a dynamic method of reassigning key 
symbols to keycodes. After 'loadkeys' is used, the keyboard driver's .translation tables 
are updated. 
There are two helper applications that are useful for creating a keymap_ to 
be loaded with 'loadkeys'. The 'dumpkeys' application is used to display the current 
contents of the keyboard driver's translation tables [Ref.28]. Specifically, 'dumpkeys -1' 
will print a list of all key symbols that can be used with 'loadkeys'. The 'showkey' 
application used with option 'k' ('showkey -k') will display the keycode(s) to the screen 
as the user presses the key(s) [Ref.29]. In summary, 'dumpkeys -1' will provide a list of 
key symbols, 'showkey -k' will provide the keycodes to specific keys, and 'loadkeys' can 
be used to link the keycodes and keysymbols together and update the keyboard driver's 
translation tables. Figure 9 shows how the keymap is used with 'loadkeys' to update the 
keyboard driver translation table. Figure 9 also shows how the helper applications 
'showkey' and 'dumpkeys' are used to gather information for creating keymaps. 
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Figure 9. Loadkeys Description 
'SAK' is a supported key symbol listed by 'dumpkeys -1' and when 
mapped to a keycode using 'loadkeys', performs the same as Alt-SysRq-K when the 
MSRK is enabled. It performs the same as the MSRK because the 'SAK' key symbol is 
defined in the special function table in the key handler. The SAK function in the key 
handler calls the 'do_SAK' function in the terminal driver [Ref.22],[Ref.25]. Therefore, 
any keycode mapped to the 'SAK' key symbol using 'loadkeys' will implement the 
original Linux SAK. 
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The problem with 'loadkeys' is that it allows a user application to modify 
the keyboard driver's translation tables. A true SAK should not be modifiable by any 
means outside of the TCB. If the SAK were implemented using 'loadkeys', it would be 
easy to alter the SAK to perform a different action or launch a login spoof program. That 
is why the MSRK provides the best implementation for a SAK. Even if the original 
Linux SAK key symbol is assigned (using 'loadkeys') to the keycode for Alt-SysRq, the 
MSRK handler will catch the keycode and the keyboard mode controller will never see it 
unless the MSRK handler passes it on (which it does not do). 
2. Modifications Needed 
a. Magic System Request Key 
The Magic System Request Key provides a mechanism to invoke a 
kemelized SAK. The implementation of the MSRK will be used to provide a skeleton for 
implementing the SAK driver. The Trusted Path cannot have all of the destructive 
functionality inherent in the various options of the standard Linux MSRK. Therefore, 
only the 'K' option will be retained for implementation of the SAK. All other keys will 
default to 'do nothing'. 
b. SAK Driver 
The source code for the SAK driver will be called 'sak.c' and will reside 
in the 'llinux/drivers/char/' directory. The 'K' option will be modified to call the 
appropriate interface (Login driver or Trusted_Path_Menu_Driver) based on the current 
state provided by the State Database. 
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS 
The SAK_Driver and the dumbgetty process were implemented to show that the 
Secure Attention Key was possible. The SAK_Driver was implemented using the Magic 
System Request Key (MSRK) driver as a skeleton. The MSRK and the SAK_Driver rely 
on the keyboard driver ('linux/drivers/char/keyboard.c' & 'linux/drivers/char/pc_keyb.c') 
to function appropriately. The MSRK uses the constant CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ to 
enable and disable the appropriate code sections included in the keyboard driver. 
Therefore, a constant CONFIG_SAK was created to enable and disable the SAK_Driver 
in the keyboard driver. Everywhere in the keyboard driver that 
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ is defined, CONFIG_SAK has also been defined. The 
definitions have been modified so that if both CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ and 
CONFIG_SAK are enabled, CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ will be disabled. This ensures 
that the SAK_Driver takes precedence over the MSRK and no resource conflicts will 
occur. However, it is still a good idea to disable the MSRK when the SAK_Driver is 
enabled. The additions and modifications to the keyboard driver files are shown in 
Appendix B. 
The 'make xconfig' command in X-windows was used to configure the kernel for 
recompilation during this implementation. The 'make xconfig' command launches the 
Linux kernel configuration menu. The configuration menu contains many sections (sub-
menus) that list modules and drivers available for compiling when selected. One section, 
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Kernel Hacking, contains the options for enabling and disabling the MSRK. The script 
for the menu ('linux/scripts/kconfig.tk') was modified to include the Secure Attention 
Key (CONFIG_SAK) in the Kernel Hacking section. Now the user has the ability to 
select the appropriate configuration option for enabling/disabling the Secure Attention 
Key during compilation. The modifications to the configuration menu script are shown in 
Appendix B. 
The 'dumbgetty' process was implemented and is called by 'init' after all of the 
initialization processes have been started. As described in Chapter III, the 'inittab' file is 
used to tell 'init' which processes to run when initializing the system. The 'inittab' file 
was modified to call only 'dumbgetty' after initialization is complete. The original 
'inittab' file was set up to start six separate ttys using the 'mingetty' application. The 
modified 'inittab' file is shown in Appendix B. 
With the implementation of 'dumbgetty' and the SAK_Driver, Linux now· offers a 
reasonable user interface for the Secure Attention Key. When the system is started, 
'dumbgetty' is called and the message "Press the Secure Attention Key (Alt-SysRq-K) to 
continue" is displayed to the screen. When the SAKis pressed, the SAK_Driver handles 
the keycode and displays the message "SysRq: Congratulations, you've pressed the 
SAK". If the user presses any key other than 'K' in combination with 'Alt-SysRq', the 
message "Alt-SysRq-K is the SAK; press the SAK to continue" is displayed. 
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B. PROBLEMSENCOUNTERED 
The major hurdle for this thesis was in determining where to put the Secure 
Attention Key. The research started with the 'Ctrl-Alt-Del' key sequence which is 
actually trapped by 'init' and assigned to the 'shutdown' application in the 'inittab' file. 
It was believed that by studying the 'Ctrl-Alt-Del' key sequence, some light may be 
shown as to how the SAK could be implemented. However, 'Ctrl-Alt-Del' turned out not 
to be the ideal place to look. The original Linux SAK is not a highly publicized item in 
the Linux documentation available on the Internet. Brouwer's publication "Kernel 
Korner: The Linux Keyboard Driver" was invaluable for understanding the inner 
workings of the keyboard [Ref.26]. Also extremely helpful was Brouwer's publication 
"The Linux keyboard and console HOWTO", written for the Linux Documentation 
Project [Ref.30]. After a considerable amount of time invested in reading the keyboard 
driver files and learning how keyboard input is handled in Linux, it was possible to move 
forward and design how the SAK would be implemented. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Login_Driver 
Final design and implementation decisions need to be made for the Login_Driver. 
Research in this area could involve making a more efficient user interface for logging on 




Final design and implementation decisions need to be made for the 
Session_Driver. Research in this area will involve a deep understanding of process 
family creation in Linux. Specifically, the ability of the Session_Driver to masquerade as 
'dumbgetty', call 'fork', and call 'execve' to start a new session. 
3. Trusted_Path_Menu_Driver 
Final design and implementation decisions need to be made for the 
Trusted_Path_Menu_Driver. The Trusted_Path_Menu_Driver references or is referenced 
by all of the other drivers in the Trusted Path. The design and implementation of this 
interface is not possible until the previous drivers have been completed. 
4. Inittab 
The 'dumbgetty' file must be called by 'init' when the system has reached a ready 
state after booting. The 'inittab' file is vulnerable to attack by those who would seek to 
change the processes called by 'init'. Therefore, some research should be made into how 
'dumbgetty' can be called by 'init' without using the 'inittab' script. Otherwise, it will be 
easy to circumvent 'dumbgetty' by modifying the 'inittab' file. The current way of 
preventing this flaw is by setting the permissions of 'inittab' to be only accessible by 
'root'. In this way, only an administrator with 'root' permission would be able to modify 
'inittab'. 
5. Administrative Role 
The XTS-300 Trusted Path allows certain administrative options only to people 
with 'administrator' level priveleges. Administrator functions such as auditing, managing 
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user space, creating compartments, etc. could be made available in the Trusted Path Menu 
when the user has logged in with a valid 'administrator' usemame and password. 
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APPENDIX A. MODULE DESIGN 
A. STATE_MODULE 
This module defines the externally visible structure of the State_Module described 
in Chapter III. The module interface is used to read and modify the current state of the 
Linux Trusted Path. This module does not depend on any other module. 
External Entry Points: 
• SetTPState 
• GetTPState 
External Types and Constants: 
#define START 1 
#define READY 2 
#define LOGIN_PROMPT 3 
#define PASSWORD _PROMPT 4 
#define TRUSTED_PATH_MENU 5 
#define HELP 6 
#define SESSION_LEVEL_PROMPT 7 
#define CHANGE_PASSWORD 8 
#define NEW _PASSWORD 9 
#define CONFIRM_AND_CHANGE 10 
#define RUN 11 
#define LIST_SESSIONS 12 
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#define Kll.L_SESSION_MENU 
typedef TPState_type unsigned int 
1. SetTPState 
13 
This entry point is used to set the current state of the Trusted Path. 
a. External Interface 
int SetTPState(const TPState_type desiredTPState); 
b. Inputs 
• desiredTPState 
The desired state to be set. 
c. Outputs 
• <function result> 
The success or failure of the operation. A value of NO_ERROR 
indicates a success, while any other value indicates an error. 
d. Processing 
Verify that the state to be set is valid by comparing the input 
desiredTPState with the defined constants. If the state to be set is valid, set the TPState 
variable to the desired state from the input desiredTPState. Return the value of 
NO_ERROR as the function's return value. If the state to be set is not valid, return a 
value other than NO_ERROR as the function's return value. 
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2. GetTPState 
This entry point is used to read the current state of the Trusted Path. 





• <function result> 
The current value of the TPState variable. 
d. Processing 
Return the value of TPState as the function result. 
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APPENDIX B. SOURCE CODE 
This appendix contains the source code for the SAK_Driver that was implemented 
for Trusted Path Linux. 
A. SAK_DRIVER 
1. Sak.h 
The 'sak..h' file is located in the 'linux/include/linux/' directory. 
II --------------------------------------------------------------
File: sak.h 












The skeleton for this code is provided by the Linux Magic 
System Request Key Hacks 'sysrq.h' (c) 1997 Martin Mares 
<mj@atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz> based on ideas by Pavel Machek 
<pavel@atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz>. 






II Generic Alt-SysRq interface-- you may call it from any device 
II driver, supplying ASCII code of the key, pointer to registers 
II and kbdltty structs (if they are available -- else NULL's). 
void handle_sysrq ( int, 
struct tty_struct *); 
2. Sak.c 
struct pt_regs * struct kbd_struct 
The 'sak..c' file is located in the 'linux/drivers/char/' directory. 
* 
II -------------------------------------------------------------
11 File: sak.c 
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II -------------------------------------------------------------












The skeleton for this code is provided by the Linux Magic 
System Request Key Hacks 'sysrq.c' (c) 1997 Martin Mares 
<mj@atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz> based on ideas by Pavel Machek 
<pavel@atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz> 














































= 1 if a key has been pressed, = 0 if no 
been pressed 




Description: This function is called by the keyboard handler 
when Alt-SysRq is pressed. If no other keycode arrives, 
then the function returns and does nothing. If the keycode 
for "k" arrives, then the SAK has been pressed and a message 
is sent to the screen. If any other keycode arrives, the 
function returns and does nothing. 






struct kbd_struct *kbd, struct tty_struct *tty) 
printk(KERN_INFO "SysRq: "); 







I* k -- SAK *I 
you've pressed the SAK\n"); 






printk("Alt-SysRq-K is the SAK"); 
B. MODIFIED KEYBOARD DRIVER FILES 
1. Keyboard.c 
The 'keyboard.c' file is located in the 'linux/drivers/char/' directory. 
statement: 
a. Additions 
The following additions were placed at the beginning of the file: 
• I I if both MSRK and SAK are enabled, then disable 
the MSRK 
• #if defined(CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ) && 
defined(CONFIG_SAK) 
• #undef CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ 
• #endif 
The following addition encapsulates the #include <linuxlsysrq.h> 
• #ifdef CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ 
• #endif 
The following addition is placed after the last addition: 
• #ifdef CONFIG_SAK 
55 
• #include <linux/sak.h> 
• #endif 
b. Alodijlcations 
All instances of '#ifdef CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ' were replaced with 
the following: 
• #if defined(CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ) I I 
defined(CONFIG_SAK) 
2. Pc_keyb.c 
The 'pc_keyb.c' file is located in the 'linux/drivers/char/' directory. 
a. Alodijlcations 
All instances of '#ifdef CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ' were replaced with 
the following: 
• #if defined(CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ) I I 
defined(CONFIG_SAK) 
C. MODIFIED CONFIGURATION SCRIPT 
1. Kconfig.tk 
The 'kconfig.tk' file is located in the 'linux/scripts/' directory. 
a. Additions 
All code dealing with the MSRK or containing the text 
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ was copied and modified accordingly. 
Original text: 
• write_co:mment $cfg $autocfg "Kernel hacking" 
• global CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ 
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- --- --- --------------------, 
• write_tristate $cfg $autocfg CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ 
$CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ $notmod 
Addition immediately after original text above: 
• global CONFIG_SAK 
• write_tristate $cfg $autocfg CONFIG_SAK $CONFIG_SAK 
$notmod 
Original text: 
• set CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ 0 
Addition immediately after original text above: 
• set CONFIG_SAK 0 
Original text: 
• bool $w.config.f 30 0 "Magic SysRq key" 
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ 
Addition immediately after original text above: 
• bool $w.config.f 30 1 "Secure Attention Key" 
CONFIG_SAK 
D. DUMBGETTY 
1. Dumb getty .c 
The 'dumbgetty.c' file can be located anywhere. It has been compiled with the 













Description: This is the implementation file for the 
'dumbgetty' process. 'dumbgetty' ignores all 
signals except SIG_KILL and SIG_STOP. 
























Workhorse function for 'dumbgetty'. Ignore all 
signals that can be ignored. Display message to 
screen and sleep until killed. 
int main() { 



























signal (SIGPWR, SIG_IGN); 
printf ( 11 Press the Secure Attention Key to continue: \n II ) ; 








The 'inittab' file is located in the '/etc' directory. 
a. Additions 
Original text: 
• pr:12345:powerokwait:/sbin/shutdown -c "Power 
Restored; Shutdown Cancelled" 
Addition immediately after original text above and just before the 
modifications in the next section: 
• #Run 'dumbgetty' 
• 1:2345:once:/etc/dumbgetty 
b. Modifications 
Deleted out the following original text: 
• # Run gettys in standard runlevels 
• 1:2345:respawn:/sbin/mingetty tty1 
• 1 :2345:respawn:/sbin/mingetty tty2 
• 1:2345:respawn:/sbin/mingetty tty3 
• 1:2345:respawn:/sbin/mingetty tty4 
• 1 :2345 :respawn:/sbin/mingetty tty5 
• 1 :2345 :respawn:/sbinlmingetty tty6 
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